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"Taking combat arms officers and calling them civil affairs is just a name, not a capacity." While the Marine Corps has taken steps to meet the intent of this directive, adequately prioritizing the creation of a permanent civil affairs (CA) capability is not one of them.
Failure to address this critical shortfall with anything less than creation of an active duty civil affairs (CA) primary military occupational specialty (MOS) jeopardizes mission accomplishment in current and future operating environments.
BACKGROUND
The Marine Corps has made significant progress in preparing This leads to the loss of an investment in training, education, and experience. Without retaining experienced active duty civil affairs personnel, the CA community will never develop a proficient hierarchy of specialists able to advise at higher levels and to train at lower echelons. Unchanged, the Marine Corps will continue to have an ad-hoc "in-name-only" civil affairs capability, never a true capacity.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Changes should begin now to allocate additional resources to prepare the Marine Corps for present and future hybrid wars.
The first step in these changes is to establish a Marine Corps CA MOS school and require training for assignment to CA billets. Even with a better-funded State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, future military commanders will not be able to rid themselves of the tasks of maintaining security and stability. To truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it --to attain a political objective --the United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward. Corps' ability to conduct CA operations when artillery units must act in a conventional role and cannot simultaneously meet CA capacity requirements.
CONCLUSION
The Marine Corps has a legendary reputation as a lethal, expeditionary, and adaptable military organization. It should never seek to become a solely SSTR force. However, a recent article about the need to restructure the Pentagon, Secretary
Gates emphasized:
The United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory…kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented… Capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. The United States does not have the luxury of opting out because these scenarios do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war.
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It is time for the Marine Corps to stop taking half-steps to meet these requirements and to make the investment to develop an active duty civil affairs capacity.
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